What are Transitions For? Atrocity, International Criminal Justice, and the Political by Barrozo, Paulo D.
35822-qlr_32-3 Sheet No. 123 Side A      12/15/2014   11:57:28
35822-qlr_32-3 Sheet No. 123 Side A      12/15/2014   11:57:28
BARROZO Post-Proof.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/14 1:19 PM
675
WHAT ARE TRANSITIONS FOR?
ATROCITY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
AND THE POLITICAL
Paulo Barrozo*
I. THE PROBLEM
Transitional justice is the complex set of practices and processes 
that is supposed to help societies transition from atrocity into a post-
atrocity, better future.1 It has also been more thinly defined as a 
transition from one political regime to the next.2 Transitional justice 
practices and processes have embraced, in different degrees, the form of
law.3 Law in this context has been both generative and generated in fora: 
for constitutional reform;4 for demanding and receiving accounts from 
perpetrators of atrocities; for giving victims an opportunity to name and 
recount their personal tragedies and receive reparation; for retributive, 
 * Paulo Barrozo is an Assistant Professor at Boston College Law School. The author is 
grateful to the Boston College Law School Fund for supporting this work and to the 
organizers of the Quinnipiac Law Review Symposium on Dialogues of Transitional Justice for 
the invitation to present it. 
1 See What Is Transitional Justice? INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last visited May 20, 2014).  
2
 For foundational and endlessly illuminating analyses of law in political transitions, see 
generally OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR 
POLITICAL ENDS (1961); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); JON ELSTER,
CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004); 
GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN
RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986). For a recent 
survey that adopts O’Donnell and Schmitter’s definition of “transition” as an “interval” 
between political regimes, see Kathryn Stoner et al., Introduction to TRANSITIONS TO 
DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (Kathryn Stoner & Michael McFaul eds., 
2013). For helpful analyses of legal transitions, see generally TRANSITIONS: LEGAL CHANGE,
LEGAL MEANINGS (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). On the nature of atrocity, see infra Section III; 
CLAUDIA CARD, THE ATROCITY PARADIGM: A THEORY OF EVIL (2002). 
3 See Austin Sarat, Introduction to TRANSITIONS: LEGAL CHANGE, LEGAL MEANINGS,
supra note 2, at 1, 1–16.
4 See David Gray, Transitional Disclosures: What Transitional Justice Reveals About 
“Law,” in TRANSITIONS: LEGAL CHANGE, LEGAL MEANINGS, supra note 2, at 147, 174–77.
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consequentialist, and symbolic punishment; for the establishment of a 
truthful record of the past; and for (re)conciliation.5
All of this would be a tall order for any justice mechanism in the 
best possible social contexts. In societies about to emerge or just 
emerging from atrocity—with atrocities’ usual impact on culture, 
politics, social fabric, the economy, and the legal system—the use of 
justice as transition mechanism would seem an almost impossible 
proposition.6 Difficult as it may be, though, societies have used 
transitional justice mechanisms throughout recorded history, from 
ancient Greece7 through eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France8 and 
the United States,9 to twentieth-century Spain,10 Germany,11 Argentina,12
Bosnia,13 Rwanda,14 and South Africa,15 to mention just a few. And it has 
worked, sometimes,16 and can be perfected to work better in the future.
Judging from the countries’ immediate outcomes in terms of peace, 
deterrence, and a sense of (re)conciliation, the success of transitional 
justice experiences varies significantly.17 Counterintuitively, a more 
ideological metric—that of liberal rule of law and democratic politics—
tends to find a greater rate of success in transitional justice.18 The reason 
5 See Christopher K. Lamont, Dealing with the Past to Repair the Present: Why 
Transitional Justice Matters in Asia, ASIA PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://peacebuilding.asia/dealing-with-the-past-to-repair-the-present-why-transitional-justice-
matters-in-asia/. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6 See CLARA SANDOVAL VILLALBA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: KEY CONCEPTS,
PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES 6 (2011), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/09/07_11.pdf.  
7
 Adriaan Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens: A Case Study, 32 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 551, 551–52 (2011). 
8 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice 10 
(Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 40, 2003). 
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 11. 
13 See Marissa Wong, Has Genocide Jurisprudence Ended Impunity? Transitional 
Justice and the Case of Rwanda, E-INT’L RELATIONS STUDENTS (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/22/has-genocide-jurisprudence-ended-impunity-transitional-
justice-and-the-case-of-rwanda/. 
14 See id. 
15 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 12. 
16 See TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 25–220 (discussing “successful” 
transition cases, such as Poland, South Africa, and Chile).  
17 See TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING
PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 131–61 (2010). 
18 See id. at 146. 
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for this is clear enough: deterrence, peace, and (re)conciliation in the 
long run need more than the diet liberalism19 of legal predictability and 
elections. It is not that the prescriptions of diet liberalism are 
unimportant or insincere—“[a]ll bad poetry springs from genuine 
feeling[]” as Oscar Wilde once reminded us.20 At the end of the day, 
however, and as long as lasting deterrence, peace, and solidarity are 
concerned, the metric of diet liberalism over-sells success.21 Often, this 
metric has proven to be a dangerous distraction.22 The hope of this essay 
is that clarity about what societies ought to transition into will better 
direct the evaluation of previous models and the design of new models 
of transitional justice. 
Into what, then, should transitional justice transition? I argue in this 
essay that transitional justice should be a transition into the political,
understood in its robust liberalism version. I further argue that the most 
significant part of transitions ought to happen in the minds of the 
members of political communities, precisely where the less tangible and 
yet most important dimension of the political sets root. Both of these 
points are missing in transitional justice models and debates.23 In the 
19
 The focus on rule of law and elections is a “diet” version of liberalism when compared 
to more robust versions such as John Rawls’s or John Stuart Mill’s. See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971); JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in 
ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (John Gray ed., 1998); JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON 
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY (1824-1845), reprinted in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL (J.M. Robson ed., paperback ed., 2006) (1967), available at http://www.book2look.de/ 
book/tb4rGeQ9Bf&euid=20303671&ruid=0&clickedby=FW&referurl=www.book2look.com. 
20 The Critic as Artist: Author: Oscar Wilde, CELT: THE CORPUS OF ELECTRONIC
TEXTS, http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/E800003-007/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
21 See id.
22
 The literature on transitional justice mechanisms outcomes is growing significantly. 
This literature tends to use various metrics clustering around democracy and human rights. 
See, e.g., OLSEN ET AL., supra note 17. In this study, the authors found that transitional justice 
does make a difference. However, the authors only found positive outcomes in all metrics 
with two combinations of mechanisms: trials and amnesties; and trials, amnesties, and truth 
commissions. It is of interest for the argument for structural mercy that even a truncated 
version of traditional mercy such as amnesty has a positive effect on democracy and human 
rights outcomes, though thinly understood.
23
 This seems to be the case even in extraordinary contributions. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra
note 2; MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998). This also emerges from typologies such as 
the helpful one—“‘[w]illful ignorance’—to forget and to pardon; . . . .‘[h]istorical record’—to 
establish the truth, but to pardon; . . . . ‘[p]ragmatic retribution’—to forget, but still punish; 
. . . . ‘[n]o peace without justice’—to establish the truth and to punish the perpetrators.”—
developed in Ivan Šimonovi?, Comment, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War 
Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 343, 345 (2004). Philosophical 
interventions fare similarly. See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (NOMOS LI) (Melissa S. Williams et 
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current scenario of transitional justice models and debates, transitional 
justice practices and processes, as well as the normative forms of 
discourse that accompany them, fail to fully take the political as an end, 
thus failing in both transition and justice.24
The political—which, as I argue below, includes, but is certainly 
not reducible to, electoral and legislative politics25—has to count in at 
least two ways in the context of transitional justice. First, the cognitive, 
attributive, punitive, and constitutive dimensions of justice in transitions 
from atrocity ought to make place both for claims from and in the name 
of victims as an indictment of cruelty, and for the possibility of 
structural mercy in the present and into the future.26 Second, 
consideration of the political must lead to the imagination of the 
conditions under which a robust and equally shared experience of 
normativity and futurism might be (again or at last) possible for societies 
emerging from atrocity.27 The rejection of cruelty, the requirements of 
structural mercy, and the conditions for the political meet at the 
intersection where societies become aware of what they have done to 
themselves and to others, and of what they wish to become.28
At stake, in what societies have done to themselves and their 
members, and in what they become, are the habits of mind and 
institutions that may keep atrocities afar.29 In transitional justice, at least 
in our days, international criminal law, human rights, constitutionalism, 
and the culture of self-government meet.30 Only when transitional
justice transitions into the political is it able to justify the hope of more 
lasting peace, justice, and everything else involved in self-governing 
al. eds., 2012). 
24 See infra Part II. 
25
 One important question that arises from my argument about the political is the causal 
or correlational connection between the political, on one hand, and ordinary politics and rule 
of law, on the other. In historical terms, for example, which came first? This is, of course, a 
topic that requires an essay on its own. My only remark here is to suggest that the political has 
at times existed without democracy and rule of law, but that its existence, if ephemeral for the
political, as I argue in this essay, requires institutional bases if it is to expand to its natural 
reach and endure. That said, many governments have ordinary politics and rule of law without 
a significant experience of the political. This only reaffirms the fact that the political is 
irreducible to its bases. See infra Part II.A–B.  
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See infra Part III. 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 See infra Parts II–IV. 
30 See infra Parts II–IV. 
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collective life.31
The work of the political is, sociologically speaking, that of social 
cohesion and self-preservation; existentially and morally, and as long as 
people share their lives and fates, the work of the political is that of self-
government and hope.32
II. THE POLITICAL
The political is both a forum and a mode of participation within the 
forum.33 As a forum, the political is ideal, typically characterized by 
equal shared access, equal recognition of participants, a focus on 
collective life, and an engagement with the future in normative terms.34
As a mode of participation, the political calls for cognitive, normative, 
and attitudinal virtues.35 It lives out of individuals invested in thinking in 
deliberative, reflective, and solidaristic ways about the present and 
future of the form of collective life they inhabit; its manifestation is that 
of a political culture and practice that continuously weaves into the 
present a society’s aspirations for its future.36
Thus defined, the political has anthropological as well as 
institutional bases.37 And yet, the political is not reducible to its bases. 
No matter how many preconditions and component parts into which the
political is analyzed, there always remains an irreducible normative 
dimension to it—a dimension which, from the point of view of the 
present, is aware of the past as it attempts to bind the future to some of 
its possible configurations. In relation to its bases, the political presents 
a phenomenological surfeit of self-reflectivity, deliberation, normativity, 
and futurism. Thus, the political transmutes the potentials already 
present in its bases into an irreducible, future-oriented, normative, and 
ultimately solidarity-enhancing sphere of deliberation and binding 
31 See infra Parts II–IV. 
32 See infra Parts III–IV. 
33
 For relevant connections to my construction of the notion of the political, see 
generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22–78 (1958); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A 
CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., paperback ed., 1991) (1989); 
HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., Blackwell 
Publ’g 1991) (1974); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
34 See RAWLS, supra note 33, at 15–22.
35 See id. at 95–99. 
36 See id. at 35–40. 
37 See infra Part II.A–B. 
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choices predicated upon and advancing equality, liberty, dignity, and 
justice as guarantees of access to it and as the political’s permanently 
recommitted ends. This is certainly a normative conception of the
political. There are many examples of the political today and in the past, 
imperfect as they may be.38
The political is all too often unseen or profoundly misunderstood. 
One example of this is found in how Carl Schmitt defined politics as 
reducible to a friend/enemy relationship based on elective differences 
construed to pose an existential threat.39 All Schmitt’s phenomenology 
of the political captures is one aspect of the evolutionary transition from 
kinship-based collective organizations to relatively more inclusive forms 
of tribalism in the history of humankind. In this transition, the natural 
drive to protect one’s own genetic pool was partially sublimated or 
incorporated into new criteria of group belonging, such as the sharing of 
a territorial, linguistic, religious, or phenotypical characteristic. Granted, 
politics do not fail to have historical roots traceable to such historical 
origins. Certainly everything has a history, but history is not everything. 
Especially with regard to the political, the future is more important.
Another way to miss the political is to reduce it to yet another historical 
manifestation of ordinary politics, as Michel Foucault does:  
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it must not be 
forgotten that ‘politics’ has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly 
and directly of war, at least of the military model as a fundamental means of 
preventing civil disorder. Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, 
sought to  implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined 
mass, of the docile, useful troop . . . .40
In this view, politics is concerned primarily with the maintenance 
38 See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26–27 (George Schwab 
trans., expanded ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 168 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977). 
39
  SCHMITT, supra note 38, at 26–27. Schmitt’s ideas are not simplistic. Quite the 
opposite: they are a constant reminder of the danger of demonization and the attempt to 
escape from politics. For a thoughtful and learned engagement with Schmitt’s ideas in a 
context relevant to the themes of this essay, see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against 
Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 120–24 (2004). Luban’s article is also relevant in that it 
seeks to foreground the political nature of declaring crimes against humanity a universal 
violation: “I have argued that the aim of declaring crimes against humanity to be universal 
violations of law is ultimately to reformulate the very idea of politics to exclude these acts.” 
Id. at 121. 
40
 FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 168.
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of what is perceived or conceived either as the continuation of normality 
or as a return to normality. Whether consciously or unconsciously, it is 
with this commitment to normality in mind that transitional justice 
mechanisms usually operate within the paradigm of diet liberalism. 
Following Schmitt or Foucault, a critic of the political, as I define it 
here, might say that there is, at the heart of the phenomenological surfeit 
of self-reflectivity, normativity, and futurism, an inescapable reality that 
forces societies to simultaneously move forward through the crisis 
necessitating transitional justice and moving backward to a time, now 
undoubtedly idealized, of former well-being. The stakeholders in 
transitional justice are not primarily concerned, the critique goes, with 
promises of future utopia, but rather with atonement for the events so 
recently perpetrated and with a return to peaceful social stasis. 
And yet, just like individuals would fail to live well should they be 
unwilling to be invested in actively shaping their own biographical 
future, societies would also fail to be peaceful and normatively attractive 
should they be unwilling to proactively conceive of and enact a preferred 
future for themselves. The political is the best way societies have to deal 
with the inescapable problem of the future in a normative key. In the
political, as in other things human, there is no refuge possible in the 
refusal to make choices: inaction counts causally as much as action, for 
choices are being made all the time, whether or not one takes an active 
part in them.
A. Anthropological Bases 
The political has, of course, deep and complex anthropological 
bases.41 In this section, I simply point out some aspects of the 
ontological and epistemological dimensions of these bases. 
Ontologically, the political is founded on the phenomena of 
plurality and proximity in the life of the species.42 Plurality speaks to the 
fact that we are many and sufficiently diverse to allow each person to 
believe that he or she experiences and participates in the world in at least 
some unique ways.43 Factually, proximity means that contact, 
interaction, and intercourse are inevitable for almost everyone almost all 
41 See ARENDT, supra note 33, at 22–78. 
42 Id. at 50–58. 
43 See RAWLS, supra note 33, at 50. 
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the time.44 At both the intuitive and reflective levels, proximity allows 
individuals to develop a sense of shared destiny, that in some 
fundamental way their fates are knotted together.45 The sense of 
solidarity finds its origin precisely in this experience.46 Articulating the 
philosophical anthropology of the public realm, Hannah Arendt wrote: 
[T]he public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable 
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for 
which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised. For 
though the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are 
present have different locations in it . . . .47
Epistemologically, the political is dependent on human capacities 
for transtemporal cognition, language, judgment, and practical reason. 
Transtemporal cognition refers to knowledge and remembrance of the 
past, to an understanding of the present predicament of self and others,48
and to the ability to imagine possible futures and establish a hierarchical 
preference among them.49 Humanity, as a whole, and individuals have 
evolved to live virtually “spread out” over the temporal arc from the past 
through the present to the future.50
Language and the ability to engage in complex symbolic 
communication transformed the natural life of the species into a true 
meaningdom.51 Language’s limitless naming and adjectivizing 
44 See ARENDT, supra note 33, at 50. 
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 Id. at 57. 
48
 Think here, for example, of the idea developed by C. Wright Mills of sociological 
imagination as the self’s understanding of how history and biography meet. See C. WRIGHT
MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 143–64 (2000). A similar point, now from a 
Marxist perspective, is made by Henri Lefebvre. See 1 HENRI LEFEBVRE, CRITIQUE OF 
EVERYDAY LIFE 145 (John Moore trans., 2d ed. 2008) (1991). 
49 See 1 ERNST BLOCH, THE PRINCIPLE OF HOPE 229–30 (Neville Plaice et al. trans., 3d 
prtg., paperback ed., The MIT Press 1996) (1986); Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: 
History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014).
50 See Barrozo, supra note 49.
51 See 1 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 4 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1885) 
(“[That] man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is 
evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she 
has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere sound is but an indication of pleasure 
or pain, and is therefore found in other animals . . . the power of speech is intended to set forth 
the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of 
man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of 
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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capabilities routinely transform fact into value, behavior into ethics, and 
gregariousness into politics.52 Language is responsible for turning 
evolutionary mechanisms and institutions of social coordination, like 
families, groups, and states, into spaces where conceptions of the good 
life fight for ascendance.53 “If we are alive,” writes J. B. White, “we look 
at the world . . . around us, and say, ‘How am I to live in such a place, 
speak such a language?’”54 Language is the means and stuff of both 
cognition—episteme—and opinion—doxa.55 Because of this 
combination of hard truth and softer perspectivism, language creates the 
conditions for contestation within the confines of meaningdom. With 
language’s potential to allow presentation of opinion as truth came the 
ever-present potential for escalating conflicts beyond their practical 
stakes, leaving human associations often just a few steps away from 
disintegration.56 For good or ill, we now inhabit language; with it, we 
weave the open expanses and limits of our world, and without it, we 
would never have become a zoon politikon.57
Connected to the capacities for transtemporal cognition and 
language are the twin capacities of judgment and practical reason. 
Judgment includes the capacity to see the world from the perspective of 
others—“enlarged mentality”—before one feels ready to evaluate 
courses of action, characters, and states of affairs.58 One of the mysteries 
of the faculty of judgment is that it can never be fully subsumed under 
52 See id. at 4. 
53 See id. at 3 (“When several villages are united in a single complete community, perfect 
and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, 
originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.”). 
54
 JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 204 (2006).
55 See Louis E. Wolcher, Senseless Kindness: The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25
LAW & INEQ. 147, 148–49 (2007). 
56
 It was to this potential inherent in language that Thomas Hobbes responded with the 
prescription of a privileged nominalist speaker and a final nominalist arbiter. See THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 24–31 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991). 
57 Zoon politikon translates in English to “political animal.” Zoon Politikon, REVERSO
DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/Zoon%20politikon (last visited 
May 22, 2014). 
58 See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(MobileReference.com 2009); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (Jens Timmermann rev. ed., Mary Gregor trans., 2011); IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT (Paul Guyer ed., Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 
paperback ed., 2001); HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(Ronald Beiner ed., 1982). For an approach to the question of reconciliation inspired in an 
interpretation of the notion of “sympathy” in Adam Smith, see NIR EISIKOVITS,
SYMPATHIZING WITH THE ENEMY: RECONCILIATION, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEGOTIATION
59–133 (2010).
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instrumental know-how or scientific knowledge.59 Judgment takes the 
experience and claims of others seriously, while insisting that thoughtful 
and impartial assessment of others’ actions and the state of affairs they 
create are both possible and legitimate.60
Practical reason is a call and guide to action on the basis of a 
judgment about the affairs of the world.61 Ordinarily, individuals are not 
insensitive or neutral toward actions they believe victimize themselves 
or others.62 Neither are individuals, in normal circumstances, oblivious 
or neglectful about what they are called upon to do as a duty to 
themselves or others.63 As they move from judgment to action, practical 
reason is the guide if they aspire to act and react in ways that show 
integrity, coherence, understanding, and responsibility for themselves 
and the world around them.64
In their synergy, the anthropological bases described above make 
the experience of the political—rooted in and at the same time 
reflectively orientated toward our humanity—possible, though there are 
no guarantees. 
B. Institutional Bases 
Modern thought and experience, though a complex phenomenon, 
can be characterized as a series of frontal challenges to many of the 
traditional claims to authority in the realms of belief, knowledge, 
politics, imagination, morality, intimate relationships, productive 
practices, and institutions. One of the unifying aspirations of the 
normative force behind this confrontational posture was the 
59
 This, of course, does not mean that judgment is “mindless.” See generally Linda 
Meyer, Essay, Is Practical Reason Mindless? 86 GEO. L.J. 647 (1998).
60 See id. at 662–63. 
61
 On practical reason, see generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp 
ed., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.
A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Niditch eds., 2d ed. 1978); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF 
PRACTICAL REASON (Mary Gregor ed., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (1996); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993); Martha 
Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
714 (1994); Meyer, supra note 59; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1999) (1975); J. DAVID VELLEMAN, (1989); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
62 See supra note 61. 
63 See supra note 61. 
64 See supra note 61. 
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emancipation of humankind: emancipation from subjugation to the 
pressing urgencies and relentless cycles of nature, from political and 
social oppression, from economic exploitation and misery, from 
encompassing modes of elusive consciousness, from the scourge of 
discrimination, from unjustifiable suffering and vulnerability, and from 
cruelty. At this late point in time, the emancipatory aspirations 
articulated in modern thought have become universal, a true possession 
of humankind. These aspirations are crafted in the language of mutual 
promises of goodness, freedom, equality, and recognition of each other’s 
fundamental dignity. The fora and language of these promises are 
substratum and matter of the political.
Modern law and legal form, a similarly complex and multi-causal 
phenomenon, can never completely escape the wide and deep grip of 
modern emancipatory aspirations. More specifically, the basic legal 
institutions of a polity are not the outcome of a social algorithm, the 
mere product of the causal synergy between co-evolving social forces: 
forces that variedly favor instrumental rationalization and intra-systemic 
logics,65 transformations of forms of collective consciousness as means 
of social cohesion,66 increased capillarity of power as managerial 
technology,67 endless strategic compromising of powerful elites facing 
distributive demands from the masses in electoral democracies,68 and the 
incidental stabilization of clusters of public opinion in the open market 
of copied ideas.69 The basic institutions of a society may well be all of 
that, but they are also much more. At their best, they become the 
greenhouse in which the political grows as a continuous and profoundly 
reflective social and cultural process that operates the translation of our 
mutual promises of emancipation into normative views about the future. 
Through the political, promises of emancipation are kept updated and 
real through future-orientated imagination and reinvention. 
In this ideal sense, the political is the continuous reflective process 
65 See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).  
66 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., 
Free Press 1933) (1893).
67 See FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 170–77. 
68 See, e.g., KARL MARX, ‘On the Jewish Question,’ in EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS
(Joseph O’Malley ed. & trans., 1994). See also THE MARX-ENGELS READER 3–6, 12–15, 146–
202, 525–41 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 1977) (1976) [hereinafter MARX,
CAPITAL].
69 See MILL, On Liberty, supra note 19, at 5–19.
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of imagination, articulation, contestation, refinement, enactment, and 
then imagination again of fundamental aspects of collective life on the 
basis of ideals of liberty, equality, dignity, justice, and mutual promises 
of goodness.70 This process finds its home in constitutionalism as a 
legal/cultural process and in the constitutions that it creates over time.71
When constitutionalism and its constitutions emerge from the political,
societies become and remain self-reflective.72 As Philip Allott once 
wrote, 
Constitutionalism is a theory; that is to say, a mental ordering of the reality 
within which a particular society constitutes itself. It is an explanatory and 
justificatory theory of a society’s self-constituting. The defining characteristic 
of constitutionalism as a theory is that society makes an idea of its own self-
constituting into an ideal of its self-constituting, and incorporates that ideal
into the theory of its self-constituting. The idea is projected from the actual to 
form an ideal and, as an ideal, is reintroduced into the actual. For a society 
which adopts constitutionalism as its theory, constitutionalism enables and 
requires the society to organize and direct its own self-constituting in 
accordance with its transcendental idea of itself.73  
This reflective sense of self as a political association—including an 
awareness of what it does to itself and to others, and a vision of what it 
wishes to become—is the gift of the political to societies fortunate 
enough to host and protect it. In reciprocity, constitutionalism and its 
constitutions provide the political with the institutional means to see the 
normativity arising from it potentially achieve universalizability, 
enforceability, and durability with revisability.74
70
 Reflectivity as ennoia, in the Platonic school’s sense of reflective and intense thinking. 
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE PRE-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS 5–6 (Greg Whitlock trans., 
Univ. of Ill. Press, 1st paperback ed., 2006) (2001) (speaking of “an excess of intellect that 
[people or individuals] no longer direct . . . only for personal, individual purposes but rather 
arrives at a pure intuition with it”). Although an extensive treatment of the question of 
reflectivity cannot be accommodated in this essay, I am convinced that some form of 
intellectual exuberance of this sort is inextricably involved in reflectivity as a weighty causal 
factor in social processes. For an articulation of the ideal of a “Socratic citizenship” as a form 
of reflective agency, see DANA VILLA, SOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 299–309 (2001).  
71 See Philip Allott, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in
THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 69, 70–72 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & 
Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001). 
72 See id.
73 Id. at 69, 70 (footnotes omitted). 
74 See id. at 70–72.
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III. ATROCITY AND MERCY
Traditionally, atrocity and mercy are considered fringe phenomena, 
exceptions in the quotidian routine of societies.75 This may be so, but 
instantiations of the cruelty that atrocities are made of are not rare 
enough even in well-functioning societies. To the extent that cruelty 
sticks around, the antidote of mercy ought to be mainstreamed and 
routinized until it enters the bloodstream of political culture. Therefore, 
transitional justice must be simultaneously an expression of the rejection 
of cruelty and of a commitment to mercy. 
In this Section, I make a converging argument about cruelty and 
mercy. After offering a typology of cruelty, I argue that, as a normative 
argument about the requirements of a just and decent society,76 structural 
mercy—as distinguished from mercy in the more common use of the 
term—occupies a central place in the theory and practice of transitional 
justice. Structural mercy would be one of the best ways to inoculate 
habits of power, restraint, and frugality in the anthropological, 
institutional, cultural, and practical elements of the political.
Turning to the typology, four distinct types of cruelty usually seem 
to be present in mass atrocities.77 In previous and ongoing work, I 
explain and evaluate four analytically distinct conceptions of cruelty: 
namely, agent-objective, agent-subjective, victim-subjective, and victim-
objective/agent-independent.78 For purposes of the argument of this 
essay, the first two conceptions are encapsulated in the cruelty-as-agency
type of cruelty.79 The remaining conceptions appear in the cruelty-as-
suffering and cruelty-as-predicament types.80
Cruelty-as-agency, cruelty-as-suffering, and cruelty-as-predicament 
are distinguishable along two axes.81 In the first, the typological element 
of cruelty is found in the continuum of the perpetrator/victim 
75 See STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED (2011). 
76
 On the notion of “decent society” and that it is not subsumable to the notion of “just 
society,” see AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 1–6 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1st 
paperback ed., 1998). 
77
 I first developed this typology in Paulo D. Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, 
Cruelty, and Mercy, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 67, 70 (2008). 
78 Id.
79 Id. at 69–70. 
80 Id. at 67, 69–70. 
81
 Barrozo, supra note 77, at 70. 
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relationship.82 The second axis uses the objective/subjective continuum 
to build the typology.83 The first axis is more obvious and does not 
require further explanation.84 Coming from the objective end of the 
objective/subjective continuum, the second axis of the typology 
contemplates the objective predicament of the victim or the behavior of 
agents of cruelty in relation to objective norms of behavior.85 Coming 
from the opposite end, the typology focuses on the subjective experience 
of victims—requiring some minimum degree of actual feeling or 
awareness—whereas, on the part of agents of cruelty, it focuses on some 
element of mens rea or hedonistic gratification in suffering.86 The 
conceptual plane configured by these two axes captures all types of 
cruelty as an instrument of atrocity.87
In the cruelty-as-agency type, the agent causes physical or mental 
suffering on the part of the victim by engaging in brutality (agent-
objective) or sadism (agent-subjective) that violates legal or ethical 
norms of behavior toward others.88 In the cruelty-as-suffering type, the 
victim’s physical or mental suffering is a result more of personal 
vulnerabilities to suffering (victim subjective) than of the nature of the 
perpetrator’s behavior.89 In normal circumstances the perpetrator’s 
behavior may even fall well within the boundaries of the legally and 
ethically acceptable.90 However, because of the victim’s personal 
circumstance, idiosyncratically, or as a function in part of the larger 
context of mass atrocities, that behavior causes physical or mental 
suffering that amounts to cruelty.91
Finally, in the context of mass atrocities, cruelty-as-predicament
tends also to be prevalent.92 In the context of mass atrocities, either or 
both individualized agency and sentient victimhood is absent or at least 
insufficiently present.93 I argue that once the cruelness of cruelty is well 
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Barrozo, supra note 77, at 70. 
86 See id.
87
 Barrozo, supra note 77, at 69–70. 
88 See Paulo Barrozo, Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, 6 WASH. U. JUR. REV.
175 (2014).
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See Barrozo, supra note 88. 
93 See id.
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understood and the phenomenon is taken seriously, we will find that 
instantiations of cruelty obtain whether the victim is conscious, and 
whether there is an agent whose brutal or sadistic behavior is the 
proximate cause of the cruelty.94 In other words, the third type of cruelty 
occurs even in the absence of conscious physical or psychological 
suffering, and even if it is structurally impersonally caused.95 Cruelty-as-
predicament thus departs from the requirements of agency, 
victimization, and causality found in the other types.96 It is able to do so 
as we now understand that the cruel-ness of cruelty lies in grave 
violations of human dignity and is as preoccupied with impersonal 
structural causation as it is with agent causation.97
Of great relevance in the context of transitional justice is the 
consideration of time as a third dimension of the space formed by the 
agent/victim and objective/subjective axes of the typology of cruelty.98
Indeed, conceptions and types of cruelty implicate differentially the 
influence of time over action and causation.99 While cruelty-as-agency
and cruelty-as-suffering involve discrete units of action and feeling 
concentrated in time, cruelty-as-predicament implicates causation 
dispersed in incidence and protracted in time, often with long-term and 
harder-to-stop effects.100 If we are serious about addressing the cruelty 
that atrocities are made of, transitional justice must pay much greater 
attention to the search for solutions to problems of social vulnerability 
and unequal protection by the law.101 These solutions, I argue, 
necessarily include the (re)creation of the political, for only the political 
can match in the long term the challenge of understanding, unveiling, 
and confronting all types of cruelty, particularly the most stealthy of 
them, cruelty-as-predicament. 
The political, however, perishes whenever societies fail to adopt 
and practice a culture of power that demands restraint and frugality in 
the form and amount of violence that power routinely inflicts. By 
definition, one phenomenon is universally implicated in social orders of 
any kind: violence. Even the best constitutional orders repress some 
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Barrozo, supra note 88. 
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See Barrozo, supra note 88. 
101 See id.
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forms of violence while creating others—war and punishment, 
primarily—whose expression and deployment they regulate.102
Constitutional orders, however, are not all the same.103 If they are to 
make meaningful room for the political, the violence they dispense must 
be minimal and legitimate, for violence is the negation par excellence of
the political.104
Historically, no type of social order has raised the bar of legitimate 
war and punishment higher than the liberal democratic ones of a self-
governing citizenry.105 And yet, liberal democratic polities wage war and 
punish abundantly. In light of these realities, what the anthropological 
and institutional bases of the political require is a culture and practice of 
structural mercy as a counterpart to ordinary and extraordinary violence. 
Institutionally, structural mercy simultaneously reflects and encourages a 
restrained and frugal use of violence by states and other political sub-
units. In terms of political culture—including what Avishai Margalit 
means by both civilization and decency106—structural mercy plays a role 
in forging in the members of society a sensibility toward power and 
violence that supports and deepens the possibility and experience of the
political in the long term. Ultimately, this is the best chance for lasting 
peace, deterrence, and (re)conciliation. 
The idea of structural mercy is different from the more usual notion 
102
 That violence is implicated in the constitution and reproduction of social orders has 
been recognized throughout the ages. For examples across different intellectual traditions, see 
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., E.P. Dutton 
& Co., 1926) (1910)); HOBBES, supra note 56, at 23–27. See also Alice Ristroph, Respect and 
Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (2009); Walter Benjamin, Critique
of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 277, 277–300 (Peter Demetz trans., Schoken Books 1978) 
(1955); HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 3–31 (1970); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The 
“Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (Mary Quaintance trans., 
1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY (2009). With regard to 
punishment, no one fully understood this phenomenon before Hegel. See G. W. F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 130–31 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). Alan Norrie does justice to this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy of 
law in his book, ALAN W. NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT: RETRIEVAL AND 
CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL IDEAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991). For analysis and normative 
argument in the context of punishment, see Barrozo, supra note 88. 
103 See Luban, supra note 39, at 90–91.
104 See id.
105
 For a sophisticated and illuminating study of self-governance through cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, see Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government 8 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 326, 326–33 (2010). 
106 See MARGALIT, supra note 76, at 113. 
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of mercy.107 Ordinarily, mercy is an act of individual (private or by an 
office holder, usually the chief executive) pardon or withholding of the 
violence which the beneficiary is thought and been legally found to 
deserve.108 In comparison, structural mercy is not primarily about or 
defined in terms of isolated acts. It is an aspect of the character of a 
society’s dealings in power and violence. 
The argument here is similar to the one John Rawls advanced in 
relation to the role and subject of justice.109 He wrote:  
  Justice is the first virtue of social institutions . . . . 
  . . . . 
  Many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust . . . . Our topic, 
however, is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice is the 
basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division 
of advantages from social cooperation. . . . The basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the 
start.110
Similarly, the subjects of structural mercy are the institutions and 
forms of consciousness of a society implicated in warring and punitive 
violence. Structural mercy’s forward-looking role is to foster a culture of 
107
 On the topic of mercy, see generally LINDA ROSS MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY
(2010); Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182 (1972); Ross Harrison, The Equality of 
Mercy, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 107, 107–25 (Hyman Gross & Ross 
Harrison eds. 1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 83
(1993); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004); FORGIVENESS, MERCY,
AND CLEMENCY (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007); AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON 
TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION (2005). 
108
 It is of interest to see how mercy—at least that of the case-by-case type, such as that of 
the executive prerogative to pardon—is a multicultural value expressed as abandonment of the 
lex talionis model of retribution: “If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for 
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for 
stripe.” Exodus 21:23–27. One is tempted to think here of the influence of the Christian 
dissidence from old Hebrew law: “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the 
right cheek, turn the other also.” Matthew 5:38–39. Whereas in Matthew, Jesus preaches a 
universalizable principle of forgiveness, in the Quran we already detect the case-by-case 
approach that prevails in current executive mercy: “And we decreed for them in it that: the life 
for the life, the eye for the eye, the nose for the nose, the ear for the ear, the tooth for the 
tooth, and an equivalent injury for any injury. If one forfeits what is due to him as a charity, it 
will atone for his sins. Those who do not rule in accordance with GOD’s revelations are the 
unjust.” Quran 5:45. 
109 See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 3, 6–7. 
110 Id.
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anti-violence and the cultivation of the political as a realm for binding 
deliberation among individuals who share society under conditions of 
plurality and proximity. In the context of transitional justice, it is 
especially important to start by punishing atrocities less violently than 
warranted. 
On a more general point, if we look for the structure of values of 
advanced criminal justice systems, at least two layers emerge. In the first 
layer, the one closer to the ground, we see the constitutionalization of 
criminal law and procedure in the name of fairness, equal protection, and 
promotion of cognitively-reliable and epistemically-just evidentiary 
gathering. But historical and structural analyses reveal a second, more 
abstract layer of values that exerts a constant, if more subtle and largely 
unrecognized, shaping force over criminal justice systems. In this second 
layer, the rejection of cruelty and structural mercy occupy a prominent 
place. This ought to be the case for transitional justice as well. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Several transitional justice models incorporate some dimension of 
amnesty or pardon to perpetrators as part of punctual or general 
negotiations to end conflict. Since the end of World War II, international 
criminal law and claims of universal jurisdiction have increasingly 
narrowed the scope of amnesty negotiations.111 In transitional justice 
debates, the clash between, on one side, national and international 
criminal justice and, on the other side, amnesty has been framed as a 
choice between justice or peace.112 To frame the impact of criminal 
justice on negotiated transitions in terms of justice or peace, however, 
misses the larger point. Whether the matter is seen from a rational choice 
perspective, institutionally, symbolically, or normatively, the futures of 
transitional justice and international criminal law will be in better hands 
when the latter is constructively woven into the former. An attempt to 
construct criminal justice as an integral part of transitional justice has 
111
 I focus on international criminal law. For a theoretically sophisticated, analytically 
helpful, and prescriptively attractive work on the international criminal law and universal 
jurisdiction, see Maximo Langer, The Archipelago and the Wheel: Universal Jurisdiction and 
the International Criminal Court, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: CONSTRAINTS AND 
PROMISE (Martha Minow et al. eds., forthcoming 2014).  
112 See Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in 
Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2009); Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, 
Amnesties in a Time of Transition, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 577 (2010).
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already been underway, at least since the Nuremberg Trials. We are now 
in a much improved cognitive and normative position to understand the 
required constructive process and to evaluate the stakes in it. The 
explanatory and constructive challenge of weaving international criminal 
law into transitional justice is best confronted from a constructivist 
approach to international criminal law, to which I now turn in two 
subparts. 
A. Limitations of “Realist” Models of Legal and Political Thought 
 State-based models of jurisprudence are premised on an ontology 
that asserts that law (i) is the product of a centralized, (ii) sovereign 
power that (iii) has on its base a large enough cultural consensus or a 
functionally equivalent cultural hegemony expressed as a nation and (iv) 
that relies on sufficiently effective mechanisms—particularly material or 
physical means—of enforcement. Domestic and international realpolitik
share this ontology. In this section, I argue that this ontological paradigm 
is seriously defective, especially in the context of transitional justice. 
 A place to see the ideas of centralization and sovereignty at work is 
in the Hobbesian-Austinian idea of law as a command emanating from a 
form of social power that has the attributes of centralization and 
sovereignty.113 In the middle of the nineteenth century, Austin wrote that 
“[t]he matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so 
called: or law set by political superiors to political inferiors.”114 In this 
phrase, we see how an ontological premise became intertwined with an 
epistemological project in a way that continues to command influence 
today in all brands of “realism.” 
The ontological premise in question is characterized by the belief 
that, in society, power is predicated by scarcity. Scarcity then generates a 
competition that, in well-functioning domestic societies, is channeled to 
an impersonal institution—the modern state—which then becomes the 
crystallized locus of social power, thereby transmuted into political 
power. As a consequence, those competing for political power are in fact 
competing for positions in the top of the structure of the state. Once 
those positions are occupied, the exercise of political power by the state 
equals the decisions made by the winners in the competition for power. 
113 See HOBBES, supra note 56. 
114
 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF 
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 9 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Noonday Press 1954) (1832). 
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At the end of this process is law, which is the form par excellence
whereby modern states express their decisions. Epistemologically, a 
theory of law, so the paradigm claims, should be concerned with the 
identification of the locus of social power and with a conceptual 
systematization of its (legal) decisions. 
The international counterpart of this state-based model of legal and 
political theory is found in the so-called realist international relations 
theory. According to international relations realism, once the process of 
power concentration and will formation in each state is sufficiently 
advanced, states enter the international stage as agents who maximize 
utility—in particular, power and survival, the intentions of which remain 
opaque to the other states. This state of affairs generates a Hobbesian 
scenario of security uncertainty, the response to which is an ever-
expanding spiral of preventative security measures and counter-
measures dressed up as raw power, soft rhetoric, instrumental 
bargaining, and legal and institutional compliance when strategically 
sound.115
The problems with the ontological premises and the 
epistemological corollary of state-based realism are well known, and I 
will not expand on them here other than to mention three of them briefly. 
First, power is both scarce and abundant. It is scarce when predicated on 
finite instrumentalities, special positions of authority, or delimited 
jurisdiction. But there are instantiations of power which are abundant, 
ubiquitous, and capillary in their reach, for good or ill.116 Second, the 
phenomenon of political will-formation and decision-making in complex 
societies is such that one cannot say that the will and decisions of those 
officially in power are really what becomes ultimately posited as law or 
as international behavior. The dynamics of domestic and international 
contemporary societies are such that even the much more moderate 
claim that what the state posits is filtered by the will of those in power 
seems problematic. Third, domestic and international regulatory activity 
is all but centralized. It is decentralized in two distinct but 
complementary senses: the political institutions in charge of regulation 
are numerous, relatively independent of one another, and hardly 
115 See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
116 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 38 (critiquing the limitations of the classical 
(jurisdictional) conceptions of power and analyzing other forms and means of power); 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Vintage 
Books ed., 1990). 
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completely or at all domestic; and—again for good and ill—an 
increasing part of social regulation is carried out by private, semi-
private, and transnational non-state actors.
The ontological commitments of state-based models of law and 
politics may also be challenged for their reliance on a locus of power 
that is sovereign, both internally and externally. Internally, the exercise 
of political power has been consistently pulverized from neighborhood 
commissions to the markets and non-governmental organizations. 
Externally, the combination of all the globalizing processes in course 
makes the Westphalian and Bodinian117 conceptions of sovereignty 
irremediably inadequate. Indeed, any absolute claim to grab absolute 
sovereignty and insularity in the present international context is both 
prescriptively naïve and descriptively wrong. 
The fate of the ontological premises of state-based models of law 
and politics does not look any more promising when the next two 
components of the ontology come into question. Neither a large enough 
cultural consensus (or a functionally equivalent cultural hegemony) nor 
the availability of sufficiently effective means of enforcement are 
straightforwardly available. In the most favorable circumstances, the 
thick cultural consensus has long been replaced by a combination of thin 
meta-consensus on procedures and procedural principles of how to 
regulate thick cultural differences, and punctuated consensus such as that 
currently existing against the atrocity of cruelty in large scale. This 
situation is only deeper in societies emerging from atrocities that impact 
social cohesion and social reproduction. In relation to centralized 
enforcement mechanisms, the assumption that they will obtain is 
mistaken even in normal circumstances, and much more so in the 
context of transitional justice.118
In normal circumstances, and to add just one element of complexity 
to the equation here, it is noteworthy that legal sociology has 
exhaustively shown, in many legal domains, that centralized coercion or 
the potential for such coercion actually has only a marginal impact on 
the effort to contain anomie. Overall, obedience to law comes not from 
117 See, e.g., JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 3 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992). 
118
 To offer just one counter-example to the international relations realist’s explicit and 
implicit reliance on states’ ability to enforce the sovereign will domestically, consider the free 
ride transnational corporations and powerful national corporations enjoy—in areas such as 
tax, environment, food and drug safety, etc.—in the face of states’ enforcement mechanisms 
even when the social harms caused by those corporate entities are devastating to entire 
nations—even the most powerful ones—and the globe. 
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the threat of compulsory enforcement but rather from ideational factors 
that bear on the notion and practice of legal and political obligation. It is 
conditioning and social agents’ understandings of their identities, of their 
overlapping roles in society, of their interests, and of society’s identity 
and well-being in general that drive compliance.119 The coercion 
obsession that characterizes much of state-based models of legal and 
political discourse can, in good part, be explained by positivistic 
sensibility which relentlessly searches—in law, politics, science, and 
philosophy—for an element able to draw a clear line of separation 
between is and ought: empirically testable facts and mentalist factors. 
There is no reason that such a clear border should be desired or thought 
possible. 
In conclusion, any legal and political theory built on an ontology 
premised on centralization, sovereignty, overarching cultural consensus 
(or hegemony of a culturally cohesive elite), and on physical 
enforcement mechanisms is bound to fail, particularly so in transitional 
justice environments. The promise of a constructivist approach to the 
problems of international criminal law in transitional justice comes 
exactly from the fact that it dispenses with all four ontological 
commitments of the traditional state-based jurisprudence and politics. It 
is to constructivist insights on international criminal law and politics that 
I now turn. 
B. International Criminal Law Constructivism 
What does international criminal law and politics look like from a 
constructivist perspective? Is legal and political thought, when 
approaching phenomena from this perspective, better able to overcome 
the causal, ontological, epistemological, and moral limitations of state-
based models of law and politics? Does it matter for transitional justice? 
As a descriptive theory of reality, constructivism offers a sound 
starting point for a unified theory of international criminal law and 
politics. This section starts with the general postulates of constructivism 
in international relations theory and then moves on to a constructivist 
explanation of the place and role of international criminal law in 
transitions to the political.
International relations constructivism’s most basic postulate, as 
119
 I will return to causal force of ideational factors when discussing legal and political 
constructivism infra, pp. 701–04.
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formulated by John Ruggie, is that “[s]ocial constructivism rests on an 
irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action.”120 The
background against which this postulate’s significance is to be evaluated 
is that of modern social theories. These theories have, for the last three-
hundred years, contested one another from two ends of the spectrum of 
social causation and ontology: structure over agency, and agency over 
structure.
One end asserts the causal and ontological preeminence of social 
structure over individual agency.121 This view rests on two basic 
assumptions: first, that agency is ultimately constrained (and in some 
cases even determined) by its structural context; and second, that the 
structural context of action is the result of natural and/or historical 
evolutionary processes which largely fall beyond the reach of human 
action that aims at structural transformation. Social theories of this kind 
insist on a final and rigid ontological divide between agency and 
structure. Epistemologically, however, social causality in the micro-level 
of agency can be fully explained by an appeal to the structures that 
agents inhabit. 
On the opposite end are social theories that assert the causal and 
ontological preeminence of individual agency over social structure.122
The basic assumption here is also twofold: first, structural features of the 
social world are said to be no more than the aggregate, congealed 
outcome of self-motivated individual agency over time; and second (and 
relatedly), individual behavior can be explained by a combination of 
instrumental reasoning and preference hierarchies that are self-
determined by each individual. Now it is individual agency that lies 
sufficiently beyond the causal reach of social structures, which is the 
densest point of a complex net of individual acts in conflict, competition, 
cooperation, or overlap with each other. As a result, structures are 
epistemologically explainable as the outcome of the encounter of a 
multitude of isolated individual acts. 
What social theories have in common, at the two ends of the causal 
and ontological spectrum, is the centrality of the “subjective” in social 
explanation. Social action is the name of the game, and what people 
120
 John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 856 (1998). 
121 See, e.g., MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 68; WEBER, supra note 65; DURKHEIM, supra
note 66; ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Press
Syndicate of the Univ. of Cambridge ed., 2003). 
122 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 19. 
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think and do is either the result of a solipsist process or a consequence of 
structural contexts. Any intersubjective contact has to take one of two 
very limited forms: it is either mediated by structures which pre-
establish the script of interaction, or it is merely the consideration by 
individuals in their instrumental reasoning of others’ instrumental 
reasoning to the extent that the latter is relevant to the strategic aims of 
the former. 
Social constructivism, in general,123 and international relations 
theory, in particular, affirm the “intersubjective” nature of the social 
world. In so doing, constructivism ignores the causal and ontological 
divide and its epistemological consequences between structure and 
agency-oriented traditions of social theory. Constructivism advances the 
explanatory thesis that social structures and individual identities and 
preferences are a function of the interaction and construction of meaning 
between relevant social agents. In dialectical and irreducible ways, 
social structure, agency, and shared meaning are mutually causational. 
The social ontology and cognition that result from this reciprocal and 
irreducible system of causation is thus intersubjectively formed. One 
consequence of this turn to intersubjectivity comes in the form of an 
epistemological requirement that social theories must meet if they are to 
adequately discharge their explanatory tasks, namely that their 
explanatory endeavors must consider the intersubjectively constructed 
nature of social reality. International relations constructivism is an 
attempt to meet this epistemological requirement, and much can be 
gained from it to achieve a richer understanding of the place and role of 
international criminal law. 
Many, including Ruggie, trace constructivism’s basic postulate to 
Emile Durkheim’s repudiation of metaphysics and agent-
instrumentalism or utilitarianism in social sciences explanations, and to 
Max Weber’s concern with the appropriate methodology to deal with the 
question of meaning.124 Durkheim posits that morality, as a collective 
consciousness phenomenon, plays a central role in social causality; 
Weber utilizes a sophisticate interpretive methodology—Verstehen—for
the study of intentionality and shared meaning in society.125 In 
123 See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE
(Karen E. Fields trans., 1995); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Anchor 
Books ed. 1967) (1966). 
124 See Ruggie, supra note 120, at 856. 
125
 Utilitarianism is better understood as a moral outlook that assesses conduct and states 
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international politics, utilitarianism and a disinterest in the origins of 
shared meaning find their theoretical home in realist theory. 
International relations realism explains international actors’ 
behavior by reference to their instrumental judgment of how best to 
advance the actors’ preferences in context. In addition, realism argues 
that international actors’ preferences are said to be related to their 
identities. But identities and interests or preferences are considered 
exogenous to the system of international relations and therefore have no 
need to be accounted for in the theory. When international actors, such 
as nation-states, meet in the international arena, they come with firmly 
established identities and hierarchies of preferences. Realism contends 
that the international system does not have any important role in 
defining or transforming those identities and preferences.126
In reaction, constructivism claims that international actors’ 
identities and preferences are formed or influenced in interactions 
between individuals, institutions, states, and cultures. In short, identities 
and preferences are constructed in the very process of international 
socialization. According to this view, explanations of the structural 
constraints and of actors’ identities and preferences cannot be properly 
carried out a priori to the very social interaction thanks to which 
constraints, identities, and preferences become relevant and meaningful. 
In order to explain constraints as well as identity and preference-
formation processes, constructivism focuses on the idea of constitutive 
rules.127 Constitutive rules are those rules that create the possibility of 
giving to certain deeds or situations a meaning they would otherwise 
lack.128 Constitutive rules operate by establishing frameworks of 
meaning and by allocating roles in a script or structure. Once in place, 
these frameworks and roles enable us to see and describe forms of 
of affairs from their consequences. John Ruggie uses the term to refer to any theory that sees 
social agents as acting on the basis of a kind of rationality common to the process of accessing 
utility, that is, instrumental rationality. See Ruggie, supra note 120, at 857–61. 
126 See WALTZ, supra note 115. 
127
 “Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of 
consciously organized social activity—that is to say, they specify what counts as that 
activity.” Ruggie, supra note 120, at 871. Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point in relation to 
domestic legal systems in his Law’s Empire. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE (1986). 
128
 With this definition, I avoid the flaw in John Searle’s definition, which Ruggie 
appropriates. See JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995). For a 
critique of Searle’s conception of constitutive rules which can be applied to both Rawls’s 
seminal idea and to Ruggie’s use of Searle, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 108–11 (1970). 
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interaction that would otherwise be invisible or unintelligible. Take, for 
example, the European Union: without the treaties that created the 
Union, all the interactions at the institutional, agency, and cultural levels 
currently taking place in Europe would be impossible, meaningless, or 
unintelligible under the view of Europe as a collection of sovereign 
states engaged in “realist” international relations.129 As Joseph Raz 
wrote, “[n]ormative act descriptions are those of which a complete 
explanation must include reference to a rule.”130 There would be no 
complete description of the European Union as a reality with a strong, if 
contested, aspirational pull without reference to its constitutive norms 
and rules. 
Thus, to the extent that international politics is irreducibly 
intersubjective, as posited by an international relations constructivist 
account of it, constitutive rules are essential to the social construction of 
global reality.131 But from where do constitutive rules emerge? 
Remember here that the intersubjectivity that social constructivism sees 
in the world is that of human action. And human action is, by definition, 
ordinarily carried out as intentional action. Therefore, constitutive rules 
emerge from and are backed by collective intentionality. In this sense, 
constitutive rules have, in addition to their constitutive function, a 
129 See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A 
LABORATORY FOR LEGAL PLURALISM 61 (Naomi Norberg trans., 2002) (discussing the 
constitutive idea of the European Union). Centrally important is that, without constitutive 
rules, no normative project of social and institutional change is intelligible. For a sophisticated 
version of a normative project of this kind that operates at the level of institutions in order to 
shape constitutive rules and practices themselves, see Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the 
European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2009). 
130
 RAZ, supra note 61, at 110. 
131
 Analyzing the progressive constitutionalization of international organizations, Philip 
Allott expressed a conception of constitutionalism that provides a good illustration of my 
point. He wrote: 
Constitutionalism is a theory; that is to say, a mental ordering of the reality within 
which a particular society constitutes itself. It is an explanatory and justificatory 
theory of a society’s self-constituting. The defining characteristic of 
constitutionalism as a theory is that society makes an idea of its own self-
constituting into an ideal of its self-constituting, and incorporates that ideal into the 
theory of its self-constituting. The idea is projected from the actual to form an ideal 
and, as an ideal, is reintroduced into the actual. For a society which adopts 
constitutionalism as its theory, constitutionalism enables and requires the society to 
organize and direct its own self-constituting in accordance with its transcendental 
idea of itself. 
Philip Allott, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 69, 70 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo 
Heiskanen eds., 2001) (footnote omitted). 
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deontic function, creating new rights and responsibilities132 that reflect, 
in their turn, how international actors see themselves. That is precisely 
how ideational factors enter the system of social causation and influence 
not only what social reality is, but also how it is to be interpreted and 
understood by social agents. As a result, there is no higher or firmer 
reality, as natural lawyers and positivists long for, beyond that 
constructed by collective intentionality. The fluidity, so to speak, that 
social reality appears to have, according to the constructivist theory, is 
compensated by the liberating understanding that the world is ours to 
make and remake133 with the powers and limits of our own instrumental 
and moral imaginations. According to this view, the relationship 
between agency and structure embodies both constraint and opportunity, 
which in turn reflects the constructivist bridging of the ontological 
divide between structure-oriented and agency-oriented social theories.134
But how does a collectively-constructed society express itself 
normatively? How is a shared, normative project on the global social 
reality launched, as a moral shell, into the global future? Two 
complementary forms of normative expression predominate: social 
norms and institutional law. Norms are standards of behavior 
collectively expected from a class of actors in a domain of 
circumstances.135 As collective expectations, norms are best explained as 
shared beliefs about what would be appropriate for actors to do and to 
expect from other actors.136 In constructivist terms, law’s distinction 
from social norms is found in its institutionalization, a process at once of 
relative specification of content and of generalization of jurisdiction.137
132 See Ruggie, supra note 120, at 871. 
133
 This is well captured by Anne-Marie Slaughter: 
 Constructivists are so named, or rather so name themselves, because of 
their emphasis on the way interests and identities are construed, rather 
than fixed or given. Constructed identities and interests, in turn, are 
contingent—on ideas, culture, norms, law—a host of factors that humans, 
including scholars, activists, leaders, can influence. 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY: MILLENNIAL LECTURES 23 (Academy of Int’l Law ed., 2000). 
134 See WENDT, supra note 121, at 184. 
135
 “There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity . . . .” Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 891 (1998) (footnote 
omitted). 
136 See WENDT, supra note 121, at 185.
137 See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD
A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (Free Press 1976) (discussing the nature and emergence of 
modern law). 
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Important to stress at this point is that the difference between social 
norms and institutional law is one of degree of precision, generality, and 
institutionalization, and not one of kind. Both emanate from the same 
source: the collective intentionality of a society that, over time, 
constructs itself and sets patterns and expectations of conduct for its 
members and for those who come in contact with it. 
The constructivist explanation of law and norms makes them 
neither good nor immutable.138 Constructivism accounts for the 
phenomena of international norms and laws as products of a collective 
intentionality that, through constitutive rules, created the institutional 
platform and the framework of meaning within which international 
actors relate to one another and cultures interface. Norms, laws, and 
shared values and meaning further provide the discursive stuff that the 
actors use in their intersubjective construction of international society.139
Importantly, as they engage in international relations or in conduct that 
attract the international regard, individual and collective actors 
potentially open their identities to reform. 
I started the previous section by pointing out fours aspects of the 
causality and ontology of state-based models of legal and political 
thought, namely that law (i) is the product of a centralized, (ii) sovereign 
power (iii) that relies on a large enough cultural consensus or a 
functionally equivalent cultural hegemony expressed as a nation (iv) that 
counts on sufficiently effective material means of enforcement. This 
ontology and its ancillary epistemology fail in the context of global and 
138
 Once again, Ruggie well articulates the constraints and possibilities represented by a 
normative system seen through the lenses of constructivism:
“[M]aking history” in the new era is a matter not merely of defending the national 
interest but of defining it, nor merely enacting stable preferences but constructing 
them. These processes are constrained by forces in the object world, and 
instrumental rationality is ever present. But they also deeply implicate such 
ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders seeking to persuade 
their publics and one another through reasoned discourse while learning, or not, by 
trial and error. As a result, nothing makes it clearer than the question of agency at 
times such as ours why the constructivist approach needs to be part of the 
theoretical tools of the international relations field.
 Ruggie, supra note 120, at 878. 
139 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, General Principles: Reflections on Constructivist 
Thinking in International Law, 18 OIKEUSTIEDE JURISPRUDENTIA 117–63 (1985); MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2005) (1989); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD
(1990).
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domestic societies. Their explanatory traction is even less in societies 
emerging from atrocities. To the extent that international criminal law is 
best comprehended as part of the constitutive rules of an emerging 
socially constructed global society, as a discursive practice with a 
current institutional focus in the International Criminal Court, 
international criminal law theory lets go of the above ontological 
commitments, especially those of sovereignty, consensus bound by 
borders, and material or physical enforcement mechanisms. 
Of course, international law constructivism does not entail a 
disregard for the roles of material factors, instrumental rationality, 
power, and the like in global society. On the contrary, constructivist 
legal epistemology captures more and not less of reality. Constructivism 
is just a better theory of society to look at those factors: their origin, their 
reliance on some types of identity, their weight in the contextual 
judgment of actors, and so forth. Constructivism reveals that a great part 
of the social cohesion and cultural reproduction of the global (as well as 
of domestic) societies is the work of the use of utilitarian “regulative 
rules” that aim at specific goals.140 It does a much better job of 
explaining goals and the corresponding strategies adopted to achieve 
them, being the product of a set of perceptions, identities, and 
preferences that are socially constructed and therefore transformable in 
principle. Well understanding the process of the making and unmaking 
of the social world allows us to start to do justice to the richer 
ontological and causal complexities of the world. It does justice also to 
our moral imagination, hinging as it does on the ultimate 
transformability of both agency and structures. 
Rid of untenable ontological premises and their epistemological 
corollaries, analysis of international criminal justice reveals it as capable 
of being highly responsive to transitional justice situations. Rather than 
withdrawing points for bargain from the table of negotiations in a choice 
between peace or justice, international criminal law is part of an 
architecture of global constitutive rules designed to allow perpetrators, 
victims, and citizens in general to recast their own identities and 
preferences, and the nature of their societies as they move forward to 
found the political.
One important normative takeaway from an improved 
140
 SLAUGHTER, supra note 133, at 26 (“There is nothing wrong with ‘rules as tools’; 
instrumental rationality celebrates the human capacity to escape the constraints of structure 
and the weight of collective expectations.”).
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understanding on international criminal law and politics is that 
international criminal law ought to be woven into the very fabric of 
transitional justice as long as transitional justice aspires to be a transition 
into the political.141 When societies succeed in transitioning into the
political, those emerging from atrocity contribute back to the fabric of a 
plural global consensus that rejects cruelty and increasingly deposits 
trust in international criminal law as part of a constitutive normative 
framework that will assist individual and collective actors to reject 
atrocity as part of their identities and of the identities of the societies 
they create and inhabit. 
V. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS TRANSITION INTO THE POLITICAL
Individuals and societies are permanently stuck between past and 
future, fear and hope, remembrance and aspiration, history and utopia. 
While the backward orientation is central to a person’s sense of self-
identity over time, as well as to societies’ cohesion and cultural 
reproduction, an orientation toward the future is ultimately the most 
important to both individuals and societies. A common experience for 
individuals and the societies they inhabit is one of increasing 
meaninglessness and decline once the pull of the future is overcome by 
the drag of the past. For good or ill, the dependence of meaning and 
vitality on the future is part of the human predicament. Indeed, 
individuals who are unable to weave imagination of their personal 
futures into their choices and actions in the present seem to be missing 
something essential about living well. Similarly, societies that fail to 
make room in their current culture and institutions for constructive 
visions of their future are flirting dangerously with violence and 
destruction. Societies who succeed in making their future central to their 
current culture and institutions in a way that is deliberative and equally 
open to all have created the political.
I have argued in this essay that the sociological work of the
political is that of social cohesion and political self-preservation over 
time. Existentially and morally, for both the polity and each of its 
members, the work of the political, at least as long as we live in plurality 
141
 Luban, supra note 39 (offering a wealth of insights into the connection between 
criminalization of atrocity and the protection of politics). See also Laplante, supra note 112 
(presenting compelling argument about how to think well about amnesties, bringing human 
rights and international criminal law closer together). 
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and proximity, is that of self-government and hope. If transitional justice 
will really be a transition under justice into a lasting future of peace, 
(re)conciliation, and solidarity that rejects atrocity in the life of the 
polity, it ought to be a transition into the political.
